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NOTES
Perlin: The Agency Shop

In view of this exception to the general rule against the retroactive
effect of a statute, section 734.01 of Florida Statutes 1959, as amended,
should apply to any order allowing compensation subsequent to the
date of enactment of the statute. 6
In the express language of the amended statute, "A personal
representative shall be allowed commissions upon the amount of the
estate, real and personal, accounted for by him as compensation for
his ordinary services .

. ."

(Emphasis added.) This language seems

to be in accord with the principle that the personal representative's
right to remuneration accrues only at the time of final accounting and
allowance of the petition for commission.
CONCLUSION

Logic and precedent support the rule that the compensation of
personal representatives is governed by the law in effect as of the date
of the final accounting and order allowing compensation. The arguments supporting this view gravitate toward a central theme. The
thread of continuity that draws the arguments together is the theory
that a personal representative is not entitled to any compensation
until the final accounting is made and the order approving compensation is granted.
Although the Florida Supreme Court is in no way bound by the
holdings of courts in other jurisdictions, their decisions are persuasive
and Florida will probably follow the modern trend and weight of
authority.
DEAN CEARLES HOUK, JR.

THE AGENCY SHOP
Agency shop is a security agreement between an employer and a
recognized union requiring the payment of union fees and dues as
a condition of employment for all employees, both union and nonunion, within the bargaining unit. The effect of such an agreement
is to preclude non-union employees from being "free-riders" - employees who benefit from the collective bargaining process without
supporting it financially. It should be noted that a closed shop agreement, which is now prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act
16. See Matter of Potter, supra note 16, a case before a New York surrogate in
which these exceptions were specifically applied to the general rule.
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as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act,' required membership in the contracting union as a condition precedent to employment and for the
duration of employment. Another arrangement that should be distinguished from agency shop is union shop, which is a protected
activity under the act unless barred by state law.2 A union shop agreement requires an employee to become a union member, generally
within thirty days after he is hired. Opponents of agency shop equate
union membership with payment of fees and dues, and argue that
agency shop can be prohibited by state law.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION

8 (a) (3)

During the debates on the Taft-Hartley amendments, Senator Taft,
speaking of section 8 (a) (3)3 and of union support by non-union employees, stated that "the rule adopted by the committee is substantially
the rule now in effect in Canada."4 Under a union shop agreement
in Canada, if the union is the recognized bargaining agent all employees must pay dues, but the union cannot be compelled to admit
every employee who applies for union membership. If an employee
"pays the dues without joining the union, he has the right to be
employed."'
1. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158 (1958). The pertinent portions are as
follows: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization:
Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein . ...
(i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided
in section 159 (a) of this title, in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered
by such agreement when made . . . ; Provided further, That no employer shall
justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor
organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership
was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally
applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing
that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of
the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership ....
2. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158 (a) (3) (1958) (set forth in note 1 supra)
and 29 U.S.C. §164(b), which reads as follows: "(b) Nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any
State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State
or Territorial law."
3. See note 1 supra.
4. 93 CONG. REc. 4887 (1947). The reference is to the joint congressional
committee, and the act was passed with the rule as adopted by the committee.
5. See note 4 supra.
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Following the Taft interpretation, the National Labor Relations
7
Board, in Public Service Co. of ColoradoG and American Seating Co.,
upheld contract provisions that required non-union employees to pay
a specified amount each month for the support of the bargaining
unit as a condition of employment. The payments were equal to
the fees and dues paid by union members under the same contract.
In American Seating the Board ruled:8
"[B]ecause the legislative history of the amended Act indicated
that Congress intended not to illegalize the practice of obtaining
support payments from nonunion members who would otherwise be 'free riders,' we find that the provision for support
payments in the instant contract does not exceed the unionsecurity agreements authorized by the Act."
In Union Starch & Refining Co.9 the NLRB further clarified its
position by ruling that proviso (B) of section 8 (a) (3) extends job
protection to an employee as long as he tenders periodic fees and
dues. The union can prescribe any additional qualifications that may
preclude the employee from membership, but his job is secure. The
clear implication of this proposition is brought to light in Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 10 in which the United States Supreme Court
cited Union Starch with approval and said that "Congress intended
to prevent utilization of union security agreements for any purpose other than to compel union dues and fees.""' Organizational
rights must be distinguished from employment requirements, since
membership in the union as a condition of employment is quite different from employment conditioned on the payment of fees and dues.
These cases, taken in conjunction with Senator Taft's expression
of legislative intent, appear to stand for a single proposition-an
employee has a right to accept or reject union affiliation, but under
section 8 (a) (3) he can be required to tender fees and dues to the
union as a condition of employment.
LIMITATIONS ON UNION SHOP SECURITY AGREEMENTS

Section 14 (b)12 limits the effect of section 8 (a) (3) by allowing

the individual states to place an additional restriction on union
6. 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950).
7. 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952).
8. Id. at 802.
9. 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 815 (1951).
10. 347 U.S. 17 (1953).
11. Id. at41.

12. See note 2 supra.
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security agreements. Senator Taft, referring to section 14 (b) during
the Taft-Hartley Act debates, said:13
"[Iun the report of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare to the Senate, we stated that in our opinion there was
nothing in the bill as originally reported by the committee
which in any way would invalidate the provisions of a State
law prohibiting the dosed shop."
The NLRB, in Matter of Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., expressly upheld this congressional opinion when it stated that "Section
14 (b) ... in effect removes all Federal restrictions upon existing and
future State legislation prohibiting compulsory unionism insofar as
the National Labor Relations Act is concerned .... ."
However,
the states are not absolutely free to legislate with regard to union
security. Section 14 (b) permits them to prohibit only those agreements
requiring membership as a condition of employment. There is nothing in the section to suggest that the states can impose greater restrictions. 15
In a recently decided case, General Motors Corp.,' Board Member
Leedom expressed the opinion that in order to uphold the validity
of an agency shop arrangement "one would have to conclude that
Congress intended the word 'membership' in Section 7[17] and 8 (a) (3)
13. 93 CONG. REc. 6519 (1947). From the record it appears as if Sen. Taft
continually used the term closed shop when in fact he meant union shop.
14. 77 N.L.R.B. 791, 793 (1948).
15. The following states have right-to-work laws that expressly prohibit exaction of union fees or dues: Ala., Ark., Ga., Iowa, Miss., Neb., N.C., S.C., Tenn.,
Utah, and Va. Note also that there have been state court decisions that have
made agency shop illegal under their respective right-to-work laws: Baldwin v.
Arizona Flame Restaurant, 82 Ariz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957); Higgins v. Cardinal
Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456, cert. denied sub nom. General Drivers Union,
Local No. 498 v. Higgins, 82 Sup. Ct. 51 (1961). A Dade County, Fla., circuit
judge held that an agency shop agreement was not in conflict with the state
right-to-work law. Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks, 47 L.R.R.M. 2300
(1960). The Third Dist. Ct. of Appeal, on Sept. 14, 1961, stayed issuance of its
mandate and publication of its opinion pending a decision by the Florida Supreme
Court on a question of jurisdiction. The substance of the Third District's opinion,
although of no effect until the Supreme Court makes its ruling, was to reverse the
lower court.
16. 133 N.L.R.B-. 48 L.R.R.M. 1659, 1663 (1961).
17. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §157 (1958): "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized
in section 158 (a) (3) of this title."
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to encompass not only literal membership, but also other relationships between employees and the union, while at the same time intending that the same word in Section 14 (b) encompass only literal
membership ....-i He asserted that a dual meaning of the word
membership "runs counter to the basic Congressional purpose of
establishing a uniform national labor-management relations policy
...,"9 and concluded that he was not ready to accept such reasoning.
This approach, nonetheless, may be a desirable course to follow. The
NLRA should accomplish functional uniformity rather than semantic
symmetry. Functional uniformity can be achieved only by strict construction of the substance rather than the form of section 14 (b). Without a literal interpretation of the word membership in 14 (b) each
state can form its own policy concerning union security agreements.
Congress has adopted a general policy to eliminate industrial
strife by promoting orderly and peaceful procedures in the conduct
of labor-management relations.2 0 Although Congress has sanctioned
the union shop, it has not expressly provided for lesser forms of union
security agreements. The NLRA, however, "did not exhaust the full
sweep of legislative power over industrial relations given by the
Commerce Clause."11 It is for the NLRB and the Supreme Court
to give application to congressional incompletion. In Local 357,
Teamsters v. NLRB2Z Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority,
held that hiring halls are not outlawed by section 8 (a) (3)of the act.
Hiring halls, like agency shop, are union security devices, but they
condition employment upon union referral. Justice Douglas also
stated that "there being no express ban of hiring halls in any provisions of the Act, those who add one ... engage in a legislative act."2 3
It appears that Justice Douglas compensated for congressional incompletion by classifying hiring halls as protected activities, although
there is no express allowance therefor in any provisions of the act.
The NLRB has also filled legislative gaps by interpreting the word
membership in sections 7 and 8 (a) (3) to allow lesser forms of union
security. 24 Thus the courts and the NLRB do in fact "legislate" in
compensating for congressional incompletion. There should be no
real objection to such judicial activity as long as the results do not
exceed the national policies expressed by Congress.
18.
19.

General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. -,
48 L.R.R.M. 1659, 1663 (1961).
General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. _. 48 L.R.R.M. 1659, 1663, n.28

(1961).
20.
61 Stat.
21.
22.

"Findings and Policies," National Labor Relations Act §1, as amended,
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §151 (1958).
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
81 Sup. Ct. 835 (1961).

23. Id. at 839.
24. American Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952); Public Serv. Co. of Colo.,
89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950).
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The Impact of the GeneralMotors Decisions
In 1960, the United Auto Workers filed charges against General
Motors alleging that the company had refused to bargain collectively
with the union with reference to the inclusion of any agency shop
clause in their existing agreement. This supplementary clause was
to cover employees represented by the union as well as those hired
thereafter at the various General Motors plants in Indiana. By its
terms the employees would be required to pay to the UAW an
amount equal to the initiation fee charged by each of the local
unions and a monthly sum equal to the regular dues required of
union members. The existing contract provided for maintenance of
membership 25 and for a union shop, but did not require membership
or continued membership as a condition of employment in those
states in which it is prohibited or otherwise unlawful. General
Motors admitted the factual allegations but denied that its refusal
to bargain amounted to an unfair labor practice.
Prior to the UAW-GM dispute the Indiana Appellate Court held
that the Indiana right-to-work law2 6 was not a bar to agency shop
agreements, since the language of the law forbids only union membership or non-membership as a condition of continued employment. 27
The court reasoned that since an agency shop does not require membership, the Indiana statute did not apply to an agency shop arrangement.
The cause first came before the NLRB in February 1961.28 The
issue at that time was whether an employer violates sections 8 (a) (1)2f1
and 8 (a) (5)30 of the NLRA by refusing to bargain with a union concerning a proposed agency shop agreement that covers employees in
a right-to-work state when the state's highest court has found an
agency shop agreement lawful. The complaint was dismissed in a
three-to-two decision. Board Member Leedom concluded in the ma25. A maintenance-of-membership clause requires that all employees who are
members of the union at a specified time after the agreement is signed, and all
who later join the union, must remain members in good standing for the duration
of the agreement.
26. Ind. Laws 1957, ch. 19, §3.
27. Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
28. General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. _ 47 L.R.R.M. 1306 (1961).
29. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158 (1958). The pertinent portion is as follows: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 ...."
30. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158 (1958): "(a) It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer . . . (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159 (a) of this
title."
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jority opinion that "the agency shop clause concerning which UAW
requested GM to bargain is, under the National Labor Relations
Act, illegal in Indiana, and that GM was under no obligation to negotiate concerning such a clause with UAW. "31 Thereafter, motions
for reconsideration filed by the UAW and the NLRB general counsel
were granted. 3 2 On rehearing, since there was no conflict between
state and federal law, the parties stipulated that the decision should
be based solely on the federal act without regard to the law of any
state. With the issue thus limited, the Board reversed its earlier
decision, 33 stating that under section 8 (a) (3) agency shop "is a mandatory subject as to which General Motors is obliged to bargain." 34 Mr.
Leedom, dissenting, argued that the agency shop agreement could
have no other foreseeable consequence than to encourage membership in the UAW and discourage membership in any other union.
The exaction of the same fees and dues from members and nonmembers was described by Mr. Leedom as a form of discrimination
prohibited by the NLRA. He contended that it penalizes refusal to
join, or illegally encourages joining, because members are entitled to
many union benefits that are denied non-members.
The majority met this argument by reasserting the Union Starch
construction of section 8 (a) (3) that "even where 'membership' is
specifically required in a valid union-security contract, the union...
cannot enforce the actual membership requirement but can obtain
at most the periodic dues and initiation fees." 35 It is submitted that
the provisos under section 8 (a) (3) are in themselves discriminations
against non-membership. In the landmark decision, J. I. Case Co. v.
NLRB, Justice Jackson said:
"The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position
more than that of the group, to vote against representation;
but the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment
bargain, individual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contribution to the collective result."' 36
"... The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreeand
ments of employees with terms which reflect the strength
37
bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group."
In essence, all forms of union security, including agency shop, are
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

47 L.R.R.M. 1306, 1310 (1961).
General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B.
48 L.R.R.M. 1659 (1961).
General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B.
There was a change of personnel in the NLRB between the two decisions.
General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. -, 48 L.R.R.M. 1659, 1662 (1961).
Ibid.
321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
Id. at 338.
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discriminatory. But the provisos of section 8 (a) (3) specifically legalize
certain discriminatory acts that would ordinarily deny an employee his
rights under section 7. The second General Motors decision places
the agency shop within the purview of the section 8 (a) (3) provision
by classifying it as a protected activity, at least in those states in which
right-to-work legislation has not been enacted or there is no conflict
between state and federal law. Unfortunately, the most important
issue - the extent to which section 8 (a) (3) is limited by section 14 (b)
- remains unresolved. Therefore, this decision amounts to little more
than a reaffirmation of the Public Service and American Seating
opinions.
The General Motors decisions are harbingers of the problems still
to be faced. In both decisions Mr. Leedom stated that notwithstanding the appellate court ruling in Indiana, the agency shop agreement
is illegal there by virtue of the National Labor Relations Act. If by
illegal he means prohibited by the act, all states having right-to-work
provisions are without jurisdiction to rule on an agency shop agreement, because any activity protected or prohibited by the act is preempted from state control 38 If, on the other hand, illegal means
unprotected, the states are free to legislate as they see fit. Recognition
by Board Members Fanning and Rodgers of this fallacy in Mr. Leedom's argument is evidenced by their statement:39
"[Ilt is [not] . . . the Board's province to undermine a State
court decision interpreting a State statute. Especially is this
so in this case where the Indiana Appellate Court has already
rendered a formal decision as to the construction of the Indiana
statute."
In the first General Motors decision, Board Member Jenkins attempted to distinguish the Public Service and American Seating cases
from the UAW-GM dispute, pointing out that the first two arose
in states that did not have right-to-work laws. Thus he concluded
that proviso (B) of section 8 (a) (3)40 was applicable and that the
non-union employees could retain employment by paying fees and
dues. In the UAW-GM situation there could be no membership
requirement because the Indiana right-to-work law prohibits membership as a condition of employment. Therefore, Mr. Jenkins believed that proviso (B) was not applicable and that the non-union
employees had no alternative. Rodgers and Fanning retorted:41
38.
39.

Delony, Good Faith in Collective Bargaining, 12 U. FrLA. L. Rv. 378 (1959).
General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B.
47 L.R.R.M. 1307, 1315 n.38

(1961).
40. See note 1 supra.
41. General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B..
(1961).
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"[ilf the provisos of Section 8 (a) (3) only permit agreements
requiring 'membership', then by a parity of reasoning all
agreements requiring less than 'membership', whether or not
they are rationalized as a 'waiver' or 'alternative' to a permissible
membership requirement, would have to be considered unlawful. If parties can waive where they are allowed a 'membership' requirement, logically they can accomplish the same result absent such allowance so far as the discrimination and
interference provisions of the Act are concerned. It is inconceivable to us that Congress had such an unrealistic and meaningless purpose as advanced by our colleagues."
CONCLUSION

All unions would like to operate under maximum security - closed
shop or union shop. Under the present law, closed shop is a thing
of the past and union shop is conditioned upon the absence of
contrary state legislation. There are those, however, who maintain
that our economic system should be based on a complete right-towork philosophy. The agency shop has come into being somewhat
as a compromise - a union security device tailored to satisfy federal
labor legislation on the one hand and to reasonably restrict state
legislation on the other. Its first function has been upheld. In the
second General Motors case the NLRB classified the agency shop as
a protected activity under the National Labor Relations Act. The
Board went even further, saying that when there is no conflict between state and federal law, agency shop is a legal security measure
under the act. Unfortunately, the NLRB left for another day the
determination of whether agency shop is a protected activity in states
that outlaw such a union security device.
42
The United States Supreme Court has said:
"To leave the States free to regulate conduct . . . within
the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a
danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and
requirements imposed by state law....
[T]o allow the States
to control conduct which is the subject of national regulation
would create potential frustration of national purposes."
Federal pre-emption should be the rule except when section 14 (b)
is applied by the states to prohibit agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. Any
state that places greater restrictions on union security agreements

42.

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
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